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Abstract. Due to the sensitive nature of the data many wireless sensor networks are tasked to 
collect security of this data is an important concern. The best way to secure this data is to 
encrypt it using a secure encryption algorithm before it is transmitted over the air ways. 
However due to the constrained nature of the resources available on sensor nodes the cost, both 
in terms of power consumption and speed, of any software based encryption procedure can 
often out weigh the risks of the transmission being intercepted. We present a solution to reduce 
this cost of employing encryption by taking advantage of a resource already available on many 
sensor nodes; this resource being the encryption module available on the Chipcon CC2420 
transceiver chip. 
1.  Introduction 
Technological advancements in recent years have enabled the development of tiny, cheap, disposable 
and self contained battery powered computers, known as sensor nodes or “motes”, which can accept 
input from an attached sensor, process this input and transmit the results wirelessly to some interested 
device(s). When a number of these nodes work together, conceivably up to hundreds of thousands, a 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is formed. 
These wireless sensor networks have the potential to allow a level of integration between 
computers and the physical world that, to date, has been impossible. The uses for such networks is 
almost limitless and include such diverse applications as a counter sniper system for urban warfare [1] 
tracking the path of a forest fire [2], determining the structural stability of a building after an 
earthquake [3], or tracking people or objects inside a building [4], etc.  
Advances in wireless communication have been a major factor in allowing the development of 
large networks of sensors. However, as stated in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard specification [5], the 
wireless connectivity of the sensors is not so much a feature of the sensors but rather an application 
enabler (unlike the majority of wireless applications currently available). This is the case because 
wired sensor networks on the required scale would be very costly to build and maintain and also very 
costly to install, making them impractical. 
Despite making such sensor networks possible, the wireless nature of the sensors presents a number 
of problems to the developer. Chief among these is the problem of security. Many WSNs are designed 
to collect data which is sensitive in some way, such as information about a person’s health, 
confidential data about a company’s manufacturing process, troop locations on a battlefield, etc. 
Without adequate security this data can easily be read and/or modified by an attacker. Due to the 
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wireless nature of the sensor networks detecting and preventing eavesdropping and modification of the 
data is greatly complicated. Also the constrained nature of resources on the wireless sensor nodes 
means that security architectures used for traditional wireless networks are not viable. 
As power supply and RAM are normally the most constrained resources on a node, a memory and 
power efficient cryptographic algorithm is a very important part of any proposed security architecture 
for a WSN. Traditionally RC5 [6] and Skipjack [7] are considered to be the most suitable algorithms 
for WSNs [8, 9] due to their speed and memory usage but as shown by Law et al [10] AES [11]  or 
MISTY1 [12] can be more suitable, depending on the situation. 
A solution to reduce power and memory costs, as well as to greatly increase speed is to use a 
hardware implementation of the block cipher being used. As AES is currently the most widely used 
secure block cipher there is a larger range of commercially available implementations than any other 
algorithm. However none of the current range of wireless sensor nodes has such a chip already 
included and adding one can prove difficult and very time consuming, especially for large 
deployments. 
Another solution is available.  As can be seen by table 1 the majority of the currently available 
sensor nodes, both those commercially available and those created by research institutions, use the 
same IEEE 802.15.4 compliant transceiver, the Chipcon CC2420 [13]. The CC2420 features a number 
of security operations, including AES encryption. We test the performance of using this hardware 
encryption on the CC2420 compared with a software implementation of the AES algorithm and 
present our results here.    
2.  Background 
In this section we describe our target hardware, the operating system we use and explain why AES is 
an appropriate choice for use in wireless sensor networks. 
2.1.  Sensor Node Hardware 
The sensor nodes that work together to form a WSN are composed of four sub-systems; a computing 
sub-system, a communication sub-system, a power subsystem and a sensing sub-system. 
The computing sub-system consists of a processor and memory, which includes program memory, 
RAM and possibly non-volatile data memory. An important aspect of processors in sensor nodes is 
different operational modes, usually Active, Idle and Sleep. This is important so as to preserve power 
as much as possible without impeding the operation of the processor when it is required. 
The communication sub-system is required to enable the sensor nodes to communicate with each 
other and with a base station. Generally the communication sub-system is a short range radio but the 
use of infrared communication, ultrasound and inductive fields has also been explored. Most currently 
available sensor nodes use a radio chip which conforms to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, but as can be 
seen from table 1 some nodes use Bluetooth as an alternative. 
The power sub-system consists of a battery which supplies power to the sensor node. Due to the 
long term unattended operation of nodes in a WSN the developer must ensure every aspect of the 
network such as communication algorithms, localization algorithms, sensing devices, etc., must be as 
efficient as possible in their power usage. A power generator may also be included to recharge the 
battery onsite. Photovoltaic, motion/vibration and thermoelectric energy conversion are all possible 
sources of power, depending on the location of the node [14]. 
Sensor transducers translate physical phenomena to electrical signals. Therefore the sensing sub-
system of the node is its link to the outside world. Some nodes have sensors built in, but many do not, 
instead providing suitable ports allowing a variety of sensors to be attached for more versatility. 
2.1.1.  Chipcon CC2420 [13]. As already mentioned the CC2420 transceiver chip from Chipcon is 
currently the most popular radio chip on wireless sensor nodes. The CC2420 works in the 2.4 Ghz 
band, is IEEE 802.15.4 compliant, ZigBee ready, low cost, and designed for low-voltage and low-
power wireless applications. These features, along with a host of other features make the CC2420 
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Table 1 Selection of currently available wireless sensor nodes 
 
ideal for use on sensor nodes. 
The CC2420 feature that we are most interested in is its hardware security operations. The CC2420 
is capable of performing IEEE 802.15.4 MAC security operations, including counter (CTR) mode 
encryption and decryption, CBC-MAC authentication and CCM encryption plus authentication. The 
CC2420 also offers plain stand-alone encryption of 128 bit blocks.  Each of these security functions 
are based on AES encryption using 128 bit keys. 
One limitation of the CC2420 security wise is that it does not offer AES decryption. However the 
impact of this limitation is negated by the fact that for many applications any decryptions are 
performed by the base station which can be a much more powerful device and/or has less limitation on 
its power supply. Another option is to use a block cipher mode of operation which does not require a 
decryption function, such as Cipher Feed Back (CFB) mode, Output Feed Back (OFB) mode, or 
Counter (CTR) mode. A point to note is that the successor to the CC2420, the currently unreleased 
Chipcon CC2430 [15] does offer AES decryption, and as soon as this chip is released it is likely to 
start replacing the CC2420 on new sensor node designs. 
2.2.  TinyOS 
As can be seen from table 1 the specifications of the target hardware for our system are varied. The 
variety of processors, radio chips as well as the varying amount of RAM and program memory means 
the software written for each node would need to be significantly different. However a number of 
operating systems already exist to solve this problem. We chose to use the TinyOS [16] operating 
system as our development platform, mainly because it currently supports the largest range of 
hardware and has good power management [17]. 
TinyOS was the first operating system specifically designed for WSNs and as a result it still has the 
largest user base and is the standard by which the other operating systems are judged. TinyOS was 
initially developed at the University of California, Berkeley but is now being developed by a 
consortium and is open source, making it easy for developers to customize it as required. 
TinyOS is not an operating system in the traditional sense; rather it is a programming framework 
which contains a set of components that allows an application specific OS to be constructed for each 
particular need, consisting of selected system components and custom components. The principal goal 
of this component based architecture is to allow application designers to build components that can 
easily work together to produce a complete, concurrent system but still performs extensive compile 
time checks. 
2.3.  AES/Rijndael 
Rijndael [11] was chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology of the United States in 2001 to replace the existing Data Encryption 
Standard (DES). It is also one of the ciphers recommended for use by Japans CRYPTREC and by the 
New European Schemes for Signature, Integrity and Encryption (NESSIE) consortium. 
Rijndael is designed to work with three different key lengths of 128 bits, 192 bits or 256 bits 
depending on security requirements. A key length of 128 bits is considered more than sufficient for 
Platform MCU RAM Program Memory 
Non-volatile 
data memory Radio Chip 
BTnode3 ATMega 128 64 KB 128 KB 180 KB CC1000/ ZV4002 Bluetooth 
Cricket ATMega 128 4 KB 128 KB 512 KB CC100 
Imote2 Intel PXA271 256 KB 32 MB 0 CC2420 
MICA2 ATMega 128 4 KB 128 KB 512 KB CC1000 
MICAz ATMega 128 4 KB 128 KB 512 KB CC2420 
Shimmer TI MSP 430 10 KB 48 KB Up to 2 GB CC2420 and WML-C46 Bluetooth 
TelosA TI MSP 430 2 KB 60 KB 512 KB CC2420 
TelosB TI MSP 430 10 KB 48 KB 1 MB CC2420 
Tmote Sky TI MSP 430 10 KB 48 KB 1 MB CC2420 
XYZ ARM 7 32KB 256 KB 256 KB CC2420 
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 MICAz Tmote SKY 
  ROM   RAM ROM RAM 
CC2420_encrypt 10058 437 11872 407 
software_encrypt_ref 11980 2844 13206 2811 
software_encrypt 12720 1915 13980 1883 
software_encrypt_minRAM 12748 625 14200 887 
 
securing wireless sensor networks because the length of time any collected data needs to remain 
confidential will have long since expired before an exhaustive key search on this length key can be 
performed using currently available technology. However for increased security, at a cost of memory 
and speed, one of the longer key lengths can also easily be employed. 
One of the criteria used to choose AES was the cipher’s efficiency and performance on a variety of 
platforms, from 8-bit smart cards to high end processors. For this reason Rijndael should be well 
suited for use on wireless sensor nodes, despite their limited processing power.  
Rijndael has come under intense scrutiny both during the review process before it was chosen as 
AES and also since then. As of April 2007 no feasible attacks against the algorithm have been 
published and so it is still considered secure.  
3.  Implementation 
We implemented an application in TinyOS which employs the CC2420 hardware encryption features 
in order to encrypt 16 bytes of data and then send this data to a listening base station.  
We implemented this application for two popular sensor node platforms, Crossbow’s MICAz and 
Moteiv’s Tmote SKY. The only difference between the two versions of the application is that for the 
MICAz version we had to implement the function to read from the RAM on the CC2420 chip 
ourselves whereas for the Tmote SKY this function was already made available by TinyOS. 
Using the stand alone encryption of the CC2420 is relatively straight forward. First off the two 
Security Control registers, SECCTRL0 and SECCTRL1, which control the security operations of the 
CC2420, need to be set. As we are using key 0 as our stand-alone key we can set both of these 
registers to 0. We then write the 128 bit key and the plaintext to the appropriate RAM locations on the 
CC2420; from location 0x100 and 0x120 respectively. The SAES command strobe is then sent in 
order to begin the encryption operation. We can tell when the encryption operation is completed by 
reading the ENC_BUSY status bit, which tells us whether the encryption module is busy or not. We 
read the CC2420’s status bits by sending the SNOP command strobe. The final step is to read back the 
cipher text. As the encryption module overwrites the plaintext with the ciphertext this is simply a case 
of reading 16 bytes from the location the plaintext was originally written to, i.e. from location 0x120. 
It is worth noting that the CC2420 RAM write operation also outputs the data currently at the location 
being written to, so that a new plaintext can be written at the same time as reading out the previous 
ciphertext in order to streamline encrypting data longer than 128 bits. 
It is also worth noting that when using the other security operations supported by the CC2420, i.e. 
the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC security modes, the encryption happens after the message is buffered in the 
TXFIFO buffer, and the decryption happens before the message is read out of the RXFIFO buffer. 
This means that the encrypted message does not have to be read from the CC2420 at any stage, which 
would only have to be sent back to the transceiver for another operation anyway, so using these modes 
is even simpler and more transparent for the application developer than using the stand-alone 
encryption mode.   
4.  Results 
In the discussion and tables below the TinyOS implementation of using the CC2420 chip to perform 
AES encryption will be referred to CC2420_encrypt. In order to test the performance of using the 
CC2420 to do the encryption we needed something to compare it to. Towards this end we created 
some software implementations of Rijndael for the sensor nodes. Our first implementation, 
software_encrypt_ref, is as simple an implementation as possible based on the Rijndael AES proposal  
MICAz Tmote SKY 
7.88137 ms 13.29879 ms 
Table 2 Program memory and RAM usage (bytes) Table 3 Time to generate 
lookup tables 
Sensors and their Applications XIV (SENSORS07) IOP Publishing









  MICAz Tmote SKY 
CC2420_encrypt 294.003 µs 2.06034 ms 
software_encrypt_ref 652.15 µs 940.83 µs 
software_encrypt 565.37 µs 752.27 µs 
software_encrypt_minRAM 574.85 µs 934.83 µs 
 
[11]. This version has no optimization and all the lookup tables are generated at runtime when the 
program initializes. We made some simple optimizations to this code, including using pre-computed 
lookup tables, to produce our second version: software_encrypt. As the RAM usage of these two 
versions of the code was high we created another version which stored the required lookup tables in 
program memory. We will refer to this version as software_encrypt_minRAM. None of these software 
implementations of AES are as efficient as they could possibly be, but their run times and memory 
usage is within a few per cent of what a highly optimized version is likely to be.  
Table 2 shows the amount of program memory and RAM each implementation uses on each 
platform. As can be clearly seen the CC2420_encrypt version is the most efficient in terms of RAM 
usage. This version also uses less program memory than the other three versions, the difference not 
seeming as significant because the base TinyOS code is still the majority user of the code space. This 
table also shows that, for the most part, the Tmote SKY makes more efficient use of RAM than the 
MICAz, but is less efficient when it comes to program memory. Ideally this situation should be 
reversed because, as can be seen from table 1, the Tmote SKY has significantly more RAM available 
to it that the MICAz and significantly less program memory. 
The software_encrypt_ref version generates the lookup tables used in order to save program 
memory. This technique can also be used to save RAM. However as we saved these generated tables 
in static global arrays, they only needed to be generated once so we did not reap the RAM saving 
benefits. The time it takes to generate these tables is shown in table 3. In order to create a software 
implementation of AES which optimizes both RAM and program memory usage these tables would 
need to be generated every time they were required. 
Tables 4 and 5 show the amount of time it takes to execute various parts of code on the two platforms. 
Table 4 shows the amount of time each implementation takes running the setup procedure before 
encryption can commence. For the CC2420_encrypt version this involves setting the security registers 
and loading the key and plaintext into the CC2420’s RAM and the time taken to read the resulting 
ciphertext back is also included. For the other three versions the setup procedure involves expanding 
the key being used into each round key. Table 5 shows the amount of time it takes to actually perform 
the encryption routine on 16 bytes of data. As expected performing the encryption is much faster for 
the CC2420_encrypt version. However the Tmote SKY is nearly 15 times slower than the MICAz. 
Also, as seen in table 4, CC2420_encrypt’s setup procedure on the Tmote SKY is very slow compared 
to that of the MICAz’s. These timing differences cannot be adequately explained by the processor and 
clock differences between the two platforms and so we suspect that the difference is due to TinyOS’s 
platform specific routines that read from and write to the RAM on the CC2420. 
Tables 3 and 4 also show that the RAM optimized software implementations are slower than the 
unoptimized versions on both platforms. This increase in processing time is due to the extra overhead 
of reading from the lookup tables placed in program memory over that of reading the same table in 
RAM. 
5.  Conclusions 
We have shown that using hardware encryption instead of software based encryption is beneficial in 
terms of speed and memory usage for wireless sensor networks. In particular we have shown that 
using a resource already existing on many wireless sensor nodes, the Chipcon CC2420 transceiver 
chip, can significantly reduce the cost of securing data on a sensor network.  
  MICAz Tmote SKY 
CC2420_encrypt 29.8310 µs 449.203 µs 
software_encrypt_ref 1.49578 ms 1.94108 ms 
software_encrypt 1.45753 ms 1.87064 ms 
software_encrypt_minRAM 1.54772 ms 1.94374 ms 
Table 4 Time to run setup procedure Table 5 Time to encrypt 16 bytes    
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